fix(export_csv): neutralize CSV/formula injection in exported cells (CWE-1236)#83
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…CWE-1236) export_csv() wrote the verbatim scanned source (unit_code) and LLM-derived text columns into the CSV with no neutralization. A scanned snippet beginning with =, +, -, @ (or a leading tab/CR) is treated as a formula by Excel / Google Sheets when the analyst opens the export, enabling formula execution / data exfiltration on the analyst's machine (OWASP CSV Injection / CWE-1236). Add a _csv_safe() helper that prefixes any cell whose first character is a formula trigger with a single quote, applied to every cell before writing. The payload originates in the scanned (untrusted) source and only fires in a downstream spreadsheet app -- it is not reachable from OpenAnt's own callers -- so this is output hardening / defense-in-depth, not an exploitable-now vulnerability. It is a real producer-side output-sanitization gap (CWE-1236), distinct from the "OpenAnt processing hostile input" class. Tests: tests/test_export_csv_formula_injection.py (2 cases: _csv_safe neutralizes =/+/-/@/tab/CR and leaves safe cells unchanged; export_csv neutralizes a formula unit_code end-to-end). RED 2 failed -> GREEN 2 passed (py3.11). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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export_csv() wrote the verbatim scanned source (unit_code) and LLM-derived text
columns into the CSV with no neutralization. A scanned snippet beginning with =,
+, -, @ (or a leading tab/CR) is treated as a formula by Excel / Google Sheets
when the analyst opens the export, enabling formula execution / data
exfiltration on the analyst's machine (OWASP CSV Injection / CWE-1236).
Add a _csv_safe() helper that prefixes any cell whose first character is a
formula trigger with a single quote, applied to every cell before writing.
The payload originates in the scanned (untrusted) source and only fires in a
downstream spreadsheet app -- it is not reachable from OpenAnt's own callers --
so this is output hardening / defense-in-depth, not an exploitable-now
vulnerability. It is a real producer-side output-sanitization gap (CWE-1236),
distinct from the "OpenAnt processing hostile input" class.
Tests: tests/test_export_csv_formula_injection.py (2 cases: _csv_safe
neutralizes =/+/-/@/tab/CR and leaves safe cells unchanged; export_csv
neutralizes a formula unit_code end-to-end). RED 2 failed -> GREEN 2 passed
(py3.11).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) noreply@anthropic.com