fix(rewards): accept SIMD-0048 off-chain wrapped signatures (Ledger)#811
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Hardware wallets (e.g. Ledger via Phantom) refuse to sign arbitrary bytes and instead sign the SIMD-0048 off-chain message envelope (\xffsolana offchain | version | format | len | message). This caused authorized Ledger users to receive 403 Unauthorized when creating reward codes, since verification was only attempted against the raw message bytes. verifySignature now tries the raw message first (hot-wallet path) and falls back to the wrapped envelope across all three message formats. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Summary
403 Unauthorizedwhen callingPOST /v1/rewards/code.\xffsolana offchain | version | format | len | message). The signature is valid, but valid for the wrapped bytes, not the raw timestamp string we were comparing against.verifySignaturenow tries the raw message first (hot-wallet path, unchanged) and falls back to the SIMD-0048 envelope across all three message formats (0=ASCII, 1=limited UTF-8, 2=extended UTF-8) since wallet implementations vary.Test plan
go test ./api/ -run 'TestVerifySignature'— new subtest verifies wrapped-signature acceptance for all three formats; existing negative tests still pass.🤖 Generated with Claude Code